This was due to the zeal of NATO countries to improve Egypt`s troubled economy, the belief that Egypt should begin to focus more on its own interests than on those of the Arab world, and the hope that an agreement with Israel would catalyze similar agreements between Israel and its other Arab neighbours and help solve the Palestinian problem. Prime Minister Begin`s reaction to Sadat`s initiative, even if sadat or Carter had not hoped, showed a willingness to engage the Egyptian head of state. Like Sadat, Begin saw many reasons why bilateral discussions would be in his country`s best interest. It would give Israel the opportunity to negotiate only with Egypt, rather than with a larger Arab delegation that might try to use its size to make unwelcome or unacceptable demands. Israel believed that Egypt could help protect Israel from other Arabs and eastern communists. Moreover, the opening of direct negotiations between the heads of state and government – the diplomacy of the summit – would distinguish Egypt from its Arab neighbours. Carter`s people apparently had no idea of the secret talks in Morocco between Dayan and Sadat`s representative, Hassan Tuhami, which paved the way for Sadat`s initiative. In fact, Egypt and Israel somehow piled up to drive Carter out of his footsteps in Geneva. The basic message of Sadat`s speech to the Knesset was the call for the implementation of resolutions 242 and 338. Sadat`s visit was the first step towards negotiations such as the Cairo Preliminary Conference in December 1977. [Quote needed] The Camp David Summit, held from September 5 to 17, 1978, was a defining moment in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict and in American diplomacy.

Rarely has a U.S. president paid as much attention to a single foreign policy issue as Carter during the two-week summit. Carter`s ambitious goals for the talks were the breaking of the blockade of the negotiations and the triggering of a detailed Israeli-Israeli peace agreement. To this end, U.S. experts in the Middle East have developed a draft treaty that has served as the basis for the negotiations and is expected to be reviewed several times during the summit. Conversations proved extremely difficult, especially when the trilateral format could no longer be maintained. Instead, Carter and Vance met with the Egyptian and Israeli delegations over the next twelve days. The Camp David Accords also led to the disintegration of a united Arab front in opposition to Israel. The reorientation of Egypt created a power vacuum that Saddam Hussein of Iraq, once only a secondary power, hoped to fill.

Due to the vague language on the implementation of Resolution 242, the Palestinian problem has become the main problem of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Many Arab nations have accused Egypt of not exerting enough pressure on Israel to tackle the Palestinian problem in a way that is satisfactory to them. Syria also informed Egypt that it would not reconcile with the nation if it did not abandon the peace agreement with Israel. [8] Although the agreements were a historic agreement between two parties, often in conflict, and Sadat and Begin shared the Nobel Peace Prize in 1978 in recognition of this achievement (Jimmy Carter would win in 2002″for his decades of tireless efforts to find peaceful solutions to international conflicts), their general importance is controversial because the region is still plagued by conflict. President Sadat`s visit to Jerusalem was a psychological change that, in addition to the agreement that followed, set a precedent and enduring expectations for the organization of Israeli-Palestinian and Arab-Israeli peace.